In Iraq, U.S. Faces New Dynamics

WASHINGTON —  Pentagon strategists crafting a plan for a potential invasion of Iraq are contending with a problem they did not face during the 1991 Persian Gulf War: Iraqi President Saddam Hussein has little to lose this time by unleashing weapons of mass destruction.

During Operation Desert Storm, Hussein refrained from using chemical and biological weapons against U.S. troops, apparently reasoning that his regime could survive if he acceded to the American-led coalition’s demands and ended an Iraqi incursion into Kuwait.

Today, with Hussein’s elimination the central reason cited by the Bush administration for considering an invasion of his country, military analysts say the Iraqi leader has little to deter him from using the very weapons that war planners want to destroy.

“We’ve talked ourselves, in many ways, into a war with Iraq because [its] possession of weapons of mass destruction is unacceptable, when it’s almost certain that that very war is going to lead to the use of weapons of mass destruction,” said Ivo Daalder, a military analyst at the Brookings Institution.

That reality has forced military planners to emphasize preemptive strikes against suspected chemical and biological weapons production sites and unprecedented protection for American forces.

The plan to invade Iraq, dubbed “Operation Polo Step,” has not yet reached Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld’s desk. Under the plan, special operations troops and airstrikes would destroy chemical and biological weapons sites before the weapons there can be used against an invading American force. The preemptive strikes in the contingency plan, which was drafted by the U.S. Central Command and outlined in the Los Angeles Times on June 23 by columnist William M. Arkin, would likely occur before an invasion by as many as 250,000 troops.

Yet even vigorous strikes are unlikely to eliminate Iraq’s suspected arsenal of taboo weapons, particularly mobile production facilities and Scud missile launchers that are hard to track, military analysts say. To protect troops from such weapons, Pentagon officials are said to be stockpiling defensive material, including chemical weapons suits, vaccines and medical evacuation equipment.

The primary objective would be removing Hussein from power, and therein lies the danger, said Loren Thompson, a military analyst with the Lexington Institute think tank in Arlington, Va.

“The way we’ve gone about preparing for this operation has communicated very effectively to Saddam that he has nothing to lose by doing something crazy,” he said.

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‘Different Kind of War’

That leaves U.S. forces facing a dramatically altered conflict.

“If we go after Iraq, it is a different kind of war in every way you can imagine,” said William Taylor, a retired Army colonel and military analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “Saddam wouldn’t go down without using his ace in the hole, which is a Scud missile with chemical or biological weapons on it.”

In any war blueprint, Pentagon strategists keep in mind an old military aphorism: No plan survives contact with the enemy. With that in mind, military planners must contemplate several nightmare scenarios.

Under one, special operations assaults and airstrikes leave Hussein with some chemical or biological weapons and enough troops in Baghdad, the capital, to force the U.S. military to fight an urban battle, street by street, while facing clouds of chemical or biological agents.

Under another, the Iraqi leader, who launched Scud missiles toward Tel Aviv in 1991, would use them to deliver chemical or biological agents this time and draw Israel into the conflict. That could undermine the support of predominantly Muslim countries drawn into any U.S.-led coalition. Israel was not drawn into the Gulf War, but it has recently shown an inclination to respond vigorously to attack, and the Bush administration has defended Israel’s right to self-defense.

“If he can get a ‘dirty’ bomb or whatever--some weapon of mass destruction--into Tel Aviv, you’re going to have Palestinians jumping in the streets,” Daalder said. “And it’s going to change the dynamic.”

Pentagon officials declined to confirm the existence of the classified plan, but they acknowledged that regional commanders are developing strategies for potential conflicts in their territories.

“It should not come as any surprise that the U.S. Defense Department is continually planning all the time for possible contingencies around the world,” said Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman.

Military analysts caution that the plan has not reached the president and is one of perhaps a dozen proposals related to Iraq under consideration within the Pentagon’s Office of Strategic Planning, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other agencies.

The proposal, detailed in a 150-slide presentation by the Central Command, revealed a moderate concern about the levels of chemical and biological weapons, a source familiar with the plan said, suggesting that Pentagon officials do not believe that Hussein’s development of weapons of mass destruction has advanced seriously since the Gulf War.

Despite an apparent lack of support for the proposal from members of the 1991 coalition such as Saudi Arabia, the United States has advantages it did not have last time, including more accurate air power and more extensive intelligence. Suspected chemical and biological weapons sites in Iraq have been pinpointed by intelligence officials who have spent the last decade compiling surveillance photos and other data.

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Smarter ‘Smart’ Bombs

And although only one in 10 bombs dropped by American pilots in the Gulf War were guided “smart” bombs, that figure grew to six in 10 last fall in Afghanistan. During the Gulf War, it took hours to get intelligence on the movement of Scud missile launchers. Defense officials say bombers can now strike such targets within 30 minutes.

President Bush has repeatedly promised to oust Hussein one way or another. The disclosure, by this and other publications, of war strategies the Pentagon is discussing sometimes originates among those disaffected with the plan, including officials with the Air Force and other services who call it unimaginative and say it fails to take advantage of the air power demonstrated in the war in Afghanistan.

“A preemptive strategy is supposed to be a surprise. This one’s going to be in the Encyclopedia Britannica before it’s executed,” analyst Thompson said.

The criticism also reflects the fact that administration officials disagree over the best strategy to unseat Hussein and curtail production of weapons of mass destruction. Wayne A. Downing, a retired Army general who recently quit his post at the National Security Council, was among those arguing for a less conventional strategy that would rely heavily on Iraqi opposition groups, special operations troops, an unprecedented air campaign and fewer U.S. ground forces.

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Criticism of Proposal

Proponents of such a plan have their critics. In Afghanistan, they note, the Central Command opted in December to rely on high-tech surveillance, air raids and Afghan fighters to ferret out Osama bin Laden and members of his Al Qaeda terrorist organization who were believed to be hiding in the mountains of Tora Bora. After failing to locate Bin Laden and finding that many of the guerrillas had escaped, defense officials again targeted the same region of Afghanistan in March, using large numbers of ground troops in a U.S.-led force.

“The way we win wars is by taking territory on the ground,” analyst Daalder said. “Osama was in Tora Bora and got out because we didn’t put troops on the ground and relied on our neat gizmos ... and didn’t do it in the way we would have done it 30, 50 or 100 years ago, with men on the ground. We might have been more effective if we had done that.”

According to a U.S. official with knowledge of internal war planning discussions, the debate pits two sides within the Pentagon against each other: the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which is skeptical about a major military operation against Iraq, and civilian hawks in the defense secretary’s office, including Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz and Undersecretary for Policy Douglas Feith, who are considered pro-Israel and skeptical of Arab critics of a war with Iraq.

Whatever the merits of the competing approaches, the persistent public discussion of plans for invading Iraq makes their actual execution less likely, Thompson said.

“First of all, we’ve given Saddam ample time to make every preparation possible for our arrival,” he said. Secondly, he added, it will “force us to try something different in order to overcome his preparation.”

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Times staff writer Robin Wright contributed to this report.