How Scholars Get Pulled Into Spy Scares

The recent conviction of three U.S.-based scholars of Chinese descent on charges of spying for Taiwan is part of an unusual phenomenon: a spurt beginning late last year with the arrest of Chinese American citizens or permanent residents on espionage charges. Even in the 1970s--when many Chinese Americans began to visit the mainland, which was still overwhelmingly a totalitarian state--no such charges were brought against U.S. citizens or permanent residents.

None of those detained over the past eight or nine months on spy charges were prominent critics of China. Consequently, it is unlikely that their cases represent a regime effort to intimidate political dissent. Instead, all these incidents could represent primarily excessive zeal and normal incompetence by the Ministry of State Security and its local branches. Given the weak controls on internal security organizations in authoritarian systems, it is easy to imagine how innocent behavior or remarks by the visitors led to their detentions. China’s state secrets law is vaguely defined.

There probably are, however, other contributing factors, including strains in U.S.-China relations since the election of George W. Bush. During the election campaign, Bush portrayed China as a “strategic competitor,” in other words, a potential adversary. Very likely in reaction to this, the Ministry of State Security ordered greater vigilance against U.S. spying, and to show results, totally unjustified arrests were made.

We know something about overreaction to spy scares. Only a year ago, the U.S. was in a frenzy over China’s alleged use of a Chinese American scientist to purloin nuclear secrets from Los Alamos.

Whatever the facts of that case or the recent ones in China, it is safe to assume that U.S. and Chinese intelligence agencies have in the past both recruited or tried to recruit some ethnic-Chinese U.S.-residents and citizens for their respective purposes.

The unprecedented spate of detentions on the mainland began late last year shortly after the defection of a ranking Chinese military intelligence officer--a serious defection for China, possibly facilitated by a U.S. undercover operative. If so, the operative was very possibly a Chinese American.

Most of the U.S. citizens and residents involved in the recent cases on the mainland, however, have been accused of spying for Taiwan, not the U.S.

Clandestine agencies on Taiwan carry out extensive agent collection of intelligence on the mainland and vice versa. Presumably, Taiwan intelligence recruits not only Taiwanese visitors to China but Chinese living abroad as well. With the independence-minded Democratic Progressive Party for the first time in control of the Taipei government, tensions across the strait have increased since last year. It is a safe bet that the reality--and simple fear--of such clandestine activities have grown on both sides.

From the recent cases, it seems that some Taiwan organizations or individuals have asked U.S.-based scholars going to the mainland to collect data that would not be considered official secrets in the U.S.

This was the case with the American University sociologist Gao Zhan, who said she did not believe she was violating any laws by receiving certain documents. Nevertheless, those involved with these cases in Taiwan should have known of the sensitivity in China attached to papers marked “internal” or “restricted,” regardless of how innocuous the content.

One can only speculate whether some persons on the island deliberately attempted to stir up U.S.-China relations by making such requests to naive American-based academics.

The great game of spying for good or ill will continue. But one way for the U.S. to try to reduce the possibility of groundless detentions in China of U.S. citizen-or resident-scholars is for the CIA, speaking for all U.S. intelligence agencies, to declare that it will not recruit U.S.-based scholars or academics to collect clandestine intelligence in China--or elsewhere. This would be similar to the blanket CIA exclusion of U.S. journalists as potential agents, paid or otherwise.

But Taiwan-generated activity seems to be far and away the major element in the recent cases. Washington might also ask Taiwan to declare publicly that it also will not recruit U.S.-based scholars for intelligence collection. This will not solve the problem, but it may help.

The free travel of tens of thousands of Chinese Americans between the United States and China is vital to that country’s economic and political development. As indicated by the Chinese leadership’s response to the appeals by President Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell for the speedy release of the detainees, it is well aware of the economic stakes involved. Thus it can be hoped that if the United States takes the suggested initiative, Beijing on its side will seek to rein in its state security apparatus.