Chemistry at the Top Could Prove Volatile

SAN DIEGO —  Last week’s surprise election of Muslim cleric Abdurrahman Wahid as president of Indonesia marks the beginning of a dramatic new chapter in that country’s development. Inside and outside Indonesia, questions are swirling: How did this largely overlooked figure make it to the top? What does it mean that the expected winner, Megawati Sukarnoputri, will wind up as his deputy? Will Indonesia now be able to find stability and return to economic prosperity?

Wahid owes his new position to the decision of his predecessor, B.J. Habibie, to withdraw from the presidential race a matter of hours before the People’s Consultative Assembly met to vote on the country’s next president. In a three-way race, the Muslim vote would have been largely split between Habibie and Wahid, with Wahid finishing third. With Habibie suddenly out, the assembly was faced with a choice between Indonesia’s most respected Muslim figure and a secular woman. For Muslims, this was a nonchoice. For the more materially minded, the choice was between a canny deal-maker, Wahid, and the politically unsolicitous Megawati.

The intensity and geographic spread of the pro-Megawati rioting was alarming. In his first successful move as president, Wahid persuaded the seemingly irreconcilable Megawati to stand for vice president and then rallied the assembly to deliver the desired outcome.

At first glance, this seems an encouraging outcome. At the most basic level, it is good news that, after 54 years as an independent state, Indonesia has a democratically elected president. Equally encouraging is that Wahid and Megawati are of high moral standing. This will help restore the legitimacy of central government in Indonesia. Finally, both Wahid and Megawati have a record of standing up for religious and ethnic tolerance and democratic rights. A commitment to these values at the apex of government may calm such deeply troubled parts of the country as Aceh, Irian Jaya and Ambon. The pairing of these two diverse but highly regarded figures stands as a powerful symbol of national unity.

Be that as it may, there is much that remains troubling. To begin with, although beneficial for short-term political stability, the inclusion of Megawati is likely to be problematic. She and Wahid are, in a sense, soul mates, but they nevertheless head competing political organizations and coalitions. Wahid is indebted to various Muslim parties and the previous ruling party, Golkar. He owes nothing to Megawati or her party. Accordingly, she is likely to find herself eased to the margins of government. If so, her continued involvement in it may well prove tenuous. This will become a Wahid government, not a Wahid-Megawati government.

More worrying are questions about the likely quality of Wahid’s presidency. Perhaps the most basic of these is his ability to serve out his term effectively. Anyone who saw him in television coverage of the election and its aftermath will recognize that he is very frail. Judging from the images, it is highly unlikely that Wahid has the stamina to cope with the rigors of executive government, which means he will have to delegate much of the day-to-day political management. To complicate matters, not only is Wahid physically weak, he has become increasingly erratic.

In the wake of the two strokes he suffered in 1998, even his closest supporters privately conceded that his thinking was not as clear or consistent as before the stroke.

None of this bodes well for investors who have been anxiously awaiting a definitive resolution of the country’s leadership question. Wahid’s frailty undercuts confidence about his future leadership. Megawati, his constitutionally mandated successor, is opposed by the coalition supporting him.

A large question mark also hangs over the economy. Neither Wahid nor his party is known for its expertise or even interest in economic matters. The new president has spoken of the need to promote honesty and stamp out corruption, but nobody should be under the illusion that patronage politics are suddenly going to fade from the scene. Wahid has never used material gain as an incentive, but in the opaque world of Islamic politics in Indonesia, he is the grandmaster of Tammany Hall-style political survival.

Wahid comes to the presidency with large political debts. Because his party is small, he had to bring many others on board to build a winning coalition in the People’s Assembly. Now he will have to award cabinet posts to Suharto’s old party, Golkar, and an array of Islamic parties. As a result, economic policy is likely to become an increasingly chaotic exercise in pork-barrel politics.

All the more so since Wahid’s ability to control and coordinate the cabinet will be limited. It had been thought that the vice president could assist him with this. But it is most unlikely that ministers from parties who opposed Megawati would accept her in that role.

Indonesia has systemic economic problems of truly daunting proportions. Notwithstanding all the goodwill surrounding Wahid’s election, it is far from clear he will be able to construct a government capable of addressing these issues. This will reflect the hard reality of shaky multiparty coalition politics in Indonesia. Indeed, the deeper problem is the new political architecture that Indonesia is constructing for itself. Indonesia’s democratic reformers have, with good reason, trimmed the powers of the presidency built up under Suharto. But in their determination to prevent a repeat of the past, they run a real risk that Indonesia’s new political framework will be characterized by a weak presidency and a fragmented parliament. For the moment, however, all attention is on the man, not the system.

The messages of congratulation that President Bill Clinton and other world leaders sent to Wahid were full of hope for the beginning of a new era of stable and decent government in Indonesia. The International Monetary Fund, too, sent encouraging words and said it will resume support. Indonesia will need all the support and sympathy it can get.