Roh Tae Woo : South Korea’s President Wants a Polity to Match Its Economy

SEOUL, SOUTH KOREA —  When authoritarian President Chun Doo Hwan anointed Roh Tae Woo as his successor, to run in a rubber-stamp election for president of South Korea, in June, 1987, he hardly seemed likely to lead the country into democracy. Both Roh and Chun are ex-generals, and Roh had supported Chun in his 1980 coup. During Chun’s repressive presidency, Roh stood by his friend, serving in various Cabinet posts and, for a period, heading the 1988 Seoul Olympic Organizing Committee.

On the day Chun formalized Roh as his choice, South Korean students launched street demonstrations that won the support of the middle class and threatened to deprive Seoul of the international prestige of the ’88 Olympiad. But, on June 29, Roh stunned the nation by pledging to support a direct election of the president and, if elected, to carry out a democratization of South Korea. He threatened to resign as a candidate if Chun refused his recommendations. Chun accepted, calm returned to the streets and, in a December, 1987 election, the people elected Roh by a 37% plurality--the opposition ran three candidates against him and so split the field.

Now widespread, if still imperfect, reform has been carried out in South Korea. But public discontent with politics and his with new ruling party continues--as Roh admitted during an extensive conversation on the eve of his trip to the United States on June 29. Labor strife marred the first two years of Roh’s administration. Trade deficits have returned, alarming a nation that, since an economic takeoff began in the 1960s, has equated exports with growth.

Continuing is a bitter parochial enmity that psychologically divides the nation east and west--even as the country remains physically separated north and south. Political analysts say regional antipathy between Koreans of the southwest Cholla region--the birthplace of opposition leader Kim Dae Jung--and the southeast Kyongsang region--Roh’s native home--supersedes all other issues in Korean politics. As the constitutional limit of one term for Roh approaches--in February, 1993--parochialism again threatens to color a presidential election.

Meanwhile, more than 1.5 million armed forces of the communist North and the capitalist South confront each other along a demilitarized zone 25 miles north of Seoul, with some 43,000 U.S. troops standing guard as a symbol of the U.S. commitment to Seoul’s security.

Only in diplomacy has Roh achieved unblemished triumphs--staging of the Olympics, establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and East Europe, exchanges of trade offices with consular functions with China, and a now assured entry into the United Nations next fall.

An impeccable dresser, Roh, 58, speaks softly and slowly, by Korean standards, but in a relaxed manner, usually with a smile on his face. He held a felt pen in his right hand while talking but never used it. A pile of notes prepared by his aides sat on a table beside him. Roh never looked at them.

Question: You cited eight specific reforms in your June 29, 1987, declaration promising to bring democracy to Korea. Which has been implemented most successfully?

Answer: . . . . One of the most moving experiences for me was to see realized the people’s desire to elect the president with their own hands and to see the release of politicians and others who were imprisoned because of their conviction (that the president should be elected directly). Not only were they given an amnesty. They were permitted to run for political office. (By their release, including freedom for opposition leader Kim Dae Jung), I didn’t gain anything as the ruling party’s candidate. But my mind was set at ease, and we had a free election. That was one of the best achievements.

Q: Which least successfully?

A: . . . . I emphasized that authoritarianism . . . should be removed and that we should renovate both the system and the way of thinking that then prevailed. In my inaugural speech, I asked political leaders and government officials not to turn me into a Don Quixote. I emphasized the need for a completely fresh way of thinking . . . . Although the authority of the president should be preserved, authoritarianism should be eliminated.

Therefore, I told officials of the government and the ruling party to delegate as much authority as possible to provincial and local government authorities. What rightfully belongs to legislatures should be entrusted to legislatures. What rightfully belongs to the judiciary should be returned to the judiciary, so that voluntarism would spring up from all corners of the country . . . .

The area in which the least progress has occurred in catching up with the times is that of the political circles . . . . Our politicians have not matured enough to . . . distill conflicting demands . . . . Rather than grasping and resolving popular demands and frictions, the ruling and the opposition parties have tended to escalate them--making our society suffer even more and pay a greater price . . . .

Q: In your May statement, you said the people’s distrust in politics has reached a dangerous level and the ruling party itself needs to be reborn. Despite your reforms, why does distrust remain?

A: One of the reasons I just mentioned--the old way of thinking.

As the nation transforms itself into a democracy, the public expects and demands more than ever that politicians and political parties work harder in the best interest of the country, the people and society. Our politicians, however, have given the impression that, on the contrary, they are engrossed in self-serving maneuvers to advance the interests of only their parties, factions or themselves, personally. The process of liquidating such negative political legacies of the old era has progressed more slowly than the people expected.

Furthermore, several politicians have recently been implicated in scandals. Public misgivings about the morality of our political circles, as a result, have intensified.

The other (reason) comes from the merger of three political parties . . . as a result of an agreement between me and the leaders of two opposition parties (into the ruling Democratic Liberal Party) last year . . . . When the parties merged, the entire nation welcomed the move. But later, as conflicts surfaced, the people’s disappointment was great. Perhaps, our popularity dropped by as big a margin as it had climbed with the rise of expectations at the time of the merger.

. . . . We must speed up coordination and the process of ironing out the differences of opinions and dissatisfactions to respond to the desires of the people. That is why I said (the party must be reborn).

Q: Another area where distrust emerges is in the regional antipathies between the people of the Kyongsang region in the southeast and the Cholla region in the southwest. Can something be done to uproot these regional antipathies?

A: Friction . . . derives in part from our longstanding tradition of valuing blood and community ties . . . . (It) has been growing over the last generation . . . . During the last presidential election (when Kim Dae Jung, a native of Cholla, ran against Roh, a Kyongsang native), those sentiments deepened.

Over the last decades, Korea’s economic development focused on the eastern side of the country--in an axis of Seoul, Pusan and Japan. The southwestern provinces were left out . . . .

Of course, the 1980 Kwangju incident (200 people in the capital of South Cholla Province were killed by government troops sent in to put down demonstrations) added fuel to the fire. In the past several years, the government has been trying to reduce parochialism by taking such measures as enacting a special compensation law for the victims of the Kwangju incident . . . .

With a (new) government program to develop the west coast, the axis of national development will now move to the west side of the country. Within 10 years, the west-coast axis will be strengthened . . . and regional antipathies softened.

Q: On Oct. 31, 1988, you said you had “rearranged the functions” of the Defense Security Command and the Agency for National Security Planning, the former Korean CIA, to ensure neither intervened in politics. Yet, last summer, it was revealed that the Defense Security Command was conducting surveillance of politicians. And no revision of the Agency for National Security Planning Law has been carried out yet. Do you plan further reforms?

A: The National Security Law (banning praise of communist North Korea) has been revised. Still pending in the National Assembly is the revision of the Agency for National Security Planning Law . . . . (It would create) an intelligence committee in the National Assembly . . . to ensure the political neutrality of that agency and strengthen National Assembly oversight of its budget.

The law (establishing) the Defense Security Command does not permit surveillance of citizens. That incident was a case of mismanagement. Subsequently, the government took corrective measures to ensure better management of the command and it is now operating within the law.

Although the revised Agency for National Security Planning Law has not been enacted, management of the agency has been improved. Politicians and the news media point out any mistakes and wrongdoings. Unlike the old days of authoritarian rule, political surveillance of opposition politicians is not possible. Opposition parties and politicians are not restricted in their political activities.

I expect that a revision of the Agency for National Security Planning Law will be enacted in the near future, but there is no restriction on political activities in Korea today . . . .

The mission of the Defense Security Command is to prevent the infiltration of impure elements into the armed forces. To do that, the command must have the means to screen radical students--especially those who believe in the “juche” (self-reliance) thought of (North Korean President) Kim Il Sung and those armed with Marxist-Leninist philosophy.

When those elements enter the armed forces, there is no telling what anti-state, anti-military actions they may take. The command needs personal data. But since there has been criticism from political circles, collecting personal data on individuals before they enter military service has been ended. The command now collects personal data only after individuals enter military service.

I hope you will understand Korea’s unique situation (of national division and 1.5 million troops of the North and South facing across a demilitarized zone).

Q: Another big change in politics also appears to have occurred. No one is worrying about armed forces intervention. Will the armed forces refrain from intervening in politics even if an opposition leader should be elected president?

A: When I made my June 29 declaration and ran for the presidency, many people--especially people in the armed forces--predicted that I would be defeated. But you know the results (a victory by 37% plurality), and the military upheld its integrity and accepted the result . . . . It is no longer possible even to imagine military intervention in politics. In a democratic country, there can be no force that can negate the people’s choice expressed through elections.

Q: When will the ruling party name its candidate for the next presidential election? What role do you intend to play?

A: I will not be the one to nominate the candidate of the Democratic Liberal Party . . . . He will be chosen through democratic procedures according to the party constitution . . . . It is advisable to nominate a candidate about a year before my term of office ends (February, 1993).

Q: What is the main topic you expect to discuss with President Bush on your trip to the United States?

A: . . . . In Europe, the East-West Cold War has ended and a new international order is emerging. I hope that the Cold War in Northeast Asia and the Pacific will soon end. Under these circumstances, the United States is envisioning a “new world order,” including new policies for Northeast Asia. We have arrived at a time to think of a “new order” in Asia--for security, cooperation, peace and prosperity. I hope to have a wide-ranging exchange of views with President Bush on these issues, as well as on the future of Korea-U.S. relations.

Q: Recently, prominent Americans, as well as some South Koreans, have advocated the removal of U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea. What is you opinion about that recommendation?

A: I am aware of the recent discussions about creating a nuclear-free zone in the Korean peninsula. But, in my view, it is meaningless to talk about declaring a nuclear-free zone in Korea alone. For the Korean peninsula to be protected against a nuclear threat, the neighboring countries of China and the Soviet Union must be free of nuclear weapons. To exclude this factor and talk only about U.S. nuclear weapons in (South) Korea--and I am not aware of whether they exist here--is not logical. The three countries that possess nuclear weapons (in this region) should get together and discuss the reduction of nuclear weapons. That, I think, is more logical.

Q: What is your view about future reductions or removal of U.S. forces stationed in South Korea?

A: . . . . (Whether) North Korea’s recent decision to go along with South Korea in joining the United Nations separately means a change in North Korea’s policy toward the South remains to be seen. In these circumstances, I believe that South Korea and the United States must continue to maintain their solid cooperative relationship.

Q: Do you foresee the establishment of diplomatic relations between North Korea and the United States and between North Korea and Japan in the near future?

A: . . . . Washington has been following a policy of improving relations with North Korea in return for its signing of a nuclear-safeguard agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency; meaningful progress in inter-Korean dialogue, and the return of remains of U.S. troops killed in action during the Korean War. North Korea, however, has not altered its militant isolationism and has yet to show signs of positive change in favor of reduced tension and durable peace on the Korean peninsula . . . .

The military threat from the North has not changed in any substantial way . . . . Therefore, I do not foresee any rapid improvement of U.S.-North Korean relations in the near future. Improvement of Japan-North Korea relations, I think, will also depend on how far the North will go in changing its attitude . . . .

Q: Are you happy that you are going to the United States without a major Korean trade surplus with the United States?

A: (laughing) Why should it please me to be visiting the United States as the president of a trade-deficit nation? For 10 years, we have had a trade surplus with the United States . . . . It reached a peak of $9.6 billion in 1987, and we have been trying to correct the situation.

. . . . It has continued to shrink--to $2.4 billion in 1990. The latest statistics show that Korea’s trade with the United States during the first four months of this year registered a deficit of $1 billion . . . It is the result of our mutual efforts to balance trade. . . . . By the end of the year, trade is expected to attain equilibrium . . . .

There have been many outcries about an economic failure or an economic crisis (in South Korea). But in the midst of those outcries, we achieved an 8.9% real growth in the first quarter (of 1991) . . . . Foreign observers ask why we Koreans are so pessimistic and critical. The same thing may be applied to politics and the lack of popularity of the government. Even my own popularity has dropped.

Despite the criticism of the government and its low popularity, we won 75% of the seats in the last local elections (in March). This time, too, we probably will secure more than 50% of the seats in elections for city and provincial legislatures. (Thursday, the ruling party won 65% of provincial and city assembly seats.)