NEWS ANALYSIS : Land for Peace: Debate Heating Up : Israel: The end of the Gulf War doesn’t seem to have spawned new ideas or changed any set-in-stone attitudes.

JERUSALEM —  The end to the Persian Gulf War has prompted a heated debate over the relative military value of land occupied by Israel since 1967, a key issue in President Bush’s formula for persuading Israel to surrender territory for peace.

But rather than providing an opening for new ideas, the discussion has mainly served to reveal the unchanging nature of dominant attitudes. Neither the drama of Iraqi Scud missiles leapfrogging the territories and falling on Tel Aviv, the devastation of Israel’s most powerful enemy, nor the spectacular performance of U.S. military forces in the Middle East seemed to have shifted political obstacles to a land-for-peace formula.

The ruling coalition under Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and his Likud Party is applying lessons from the war to support familiar arguments on the need to keep occupied land. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, which was overrun in a few hours, underlined the value of strategic real estate in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights, in the government’s view. The missile attacks, while destructive, did not threaten the existence of Israel.

Inflamed discussion broke out last week when Gen. Dan Shomron, the army’s chief of staff, suggested that the need for holding the occupied land would dissipate if a general peace with Arab states could be arranged to include security treaties and arms control.

Shomron’s words, pronounced in a goodby press conference with local reporters, straddled two views of the issue. The occupied land held value for Israel in terms of self-defense, he said, but he added that the value would shrink in the case of peace with Arab states.

Israelis interpreted his remarks as implying that land could be given up if the payoff in peace and security was high enough.

“If you are speaking of countries in a state of war, territory has very great significance,” Shomron said. “But when you speak about other concepts of (peace) agreements, it’s clear that other elements enter in which diminish the risk.”

The sentiments were not new for Shomron; two years ago, he was upbraided by Shamir for saying that only a political solution, not military force, could end the Arab uprising in the West Bank and Gaza.

His latest comments created a stir because they undermined the government’s solid stand against Washington’s effort to persuade Israel to give up occupied land. The remarks also dovetailed with a recent statement made by President Bush, who asserted that territorial additions do not necessarily increase security.

Enraged right-wing politicians here suggested that Shomron advance the date for his retirement, scheduled for next month.

“The issue has become like religious heresy. It is unacceptable to even bring it up,” declared Yaron Ezrahi, a political theorist at Hebrew University.

By raising the question of the relative value of the occupied land, Shomron hit the heart of the practical dispute over what to do with the territory.

(There are ideological arguments for keeping the territory as well--right-wingers and religious nationalists believe that the land belongs to Israel by historical right--and the urge of many Israelis to hold onto the terrain would not be absolutely overcome by the easing of strategic concerns.)

Shamir and his followers contend that, in peace or war, the land must be available for Israel’s protection. Members of the prime minister’s ruling coalition have turned Bush’s land-for-peace formula on its head. We keep the land, they say, and also make peace with the Arabs. In diplomacy, this attitude translates into Shamir’s insistence that the primary goal of talks should be peace with Arab states “without preconditions.”

“Why do we have to deal with what they will demand, and who will demand what, and what will be the Israeli response when they are not even sitting with us yet?” Foreign Minister David Levy asked a visiting group of U.S. congressmen. “All this debate seems to me to be totally irrelevant. I would define it as an unsuccessful sport.”

In response to reports that Syria would consider talks with Israel, based on regaining control of a demilitarized Golan Heights, the government drew up instant plans to double the Israeli population in the sparsely settled area.

“At the moment, we are in . . . preparation of infrastructure, to actual construction of 1,200 housing units in the Golan Heights,” announced Ariel Sharon, the housing minister and a fierce advocate of expansion. “There are 11,000 Jews on the Golan today and we hope that next year, that will be increased to 20,000.”

A suspicion of Arab intentions underpins such strategy, and for some, the suspicion was reinforced by the Gulf War. Pledges reportedly made by Iraqi President Saddam Hussein not to invade Kuwait were broken, exposing the untrustworthiness of the Arab word in the Israeli view. “Saddam said he was not going to invade, and he did,” asserted Aharon Levran, a retired general and defense analyst. “Arab promises are not worth anything.”

There are suggestions that the Bush Administration is being overly optimistic by viewing Israel as ripe for making land concessions.

Although one of the country’s most dangerous enemies has been severely weakened, this is not enough to convince Israel that its eastern flank is secure, in the view of some experts. “The defeat of Iraq is a short-term event. Setting borders is for the long term,” declared Dore Gold, a defense analyst at the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies.

And America’s military debut in the Middle East does not convince some Israelis that safety can be found in a close alliance with the United States. “No one thinks it’s a great idea for Americans to defend Israel,” said analyst Gold.

Critics of the uncompromising position say that the government has taken a single-minded, ideological approach that ignores new possibilities in favor of land lust.

Iraqi missile attacks made Israel feel more insecure, argues Aryeh Naor, a former high official in a previous Likud-led government. That could lead to one of a pair of responses: compromise toward genuine peace or withdrawal into a fortress mentality. The latter suits the government’s ideological perspective, he said.

Doves contended that the missile attacks on Israeli cities devalued the currency of the land and that the war’s devastation highlighted the folly of rule over 1.7 million discontented Palestinians.

The opposition Labor Party and leftist groups favor some form of territorial concession but have been unable to argue convincingly for land compromise and lack any prospects of gaining power.

Peace, Hebrew University’s Ezrahi remarked, is akin to the coming of the Messiah for Israelis: desirable but not something on which to base policy.