A Mature Japan Should Now Become a Partner in Pacific Defense

The current U.S. partnership with Japan is simply not the way to manage American security interests in Asia and the Pacific with so important an ally as the Japanese.

To prevent further serious deterioration in U.S.-Japan relations, we recommend that both partners reassess their security alliance. We must facilitate a new role for Japan to help the United States protect the Pacific Basin. This security relationship must be based on greater equality and mutual responsibility, rather than one based on dependency, growing ill will and deep mistrust.

U.S. policy-makers are locked in an intense debate over the exact role that Japan should play in fulfilling security commitments in Asia. Some say the U.S.-Japan alliance should not be altered because it is working satisfactorily. Another argument based on the idea of “burden sharing” demands that the United States ask more money from Japan.

Both points of view are wrong and endanger the U.S.-Japan alliance in the near future. Japan must share in the costs for maintaining our defense in the Pacific and also must become an equal partner with the United States in the decision-making process in that region.

For almost 20 years Japan has spent only about 1% of its gross national product for its defense. In contrast, the United States pumps almost 7% of its GNP into defense. Why should the United States outspend the Japanese five to seven times for defense while going deeper into debt?

Moreover, the United States can no longer afford to maintain its current security commitments. Among its problems, the United States suffers from a falling savings rate, sagging productivity and a slowing pace of innovation. New economic competition from abroad has jolted many in the United States to reassess America’s economic capabilities. It is highly questionable that the country can continue to meet its security commitments in various parts of the globe unless its economy can be revitalized.

Japan has been constrained from defending itself by acceptance of the famous Article IX in its constitution. This article pledged Japan to “forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.”

But the world of the 1940s is long gone and we face a very different set of conditions in the 1990s. Japan is an economic superpower. It is a strong supporter of U.S. policies and a major trading partner.

For the first time, many Japanese are openly expressing a concern about the new expansion of Soviet military power in the Pacific Basin and a possible U.S. withdrawal from that region.

We propose a cooperative agreement with Japan based on a NATO-type arrangement. The United States could lease to Japan part of its naval facilities in the Pacific for an agreed-upon sum. The two nations could then closely cooperate to provide for the defense of Japan as well as the Pacific Basin.

We can only guess at the possible savings for the United States during a transition period that might take as long as a decade to complete. Such savings might be $3 billion or $4 billion a year with savings accumulating rapidly to $30 billion or $40 billion over the decade. The money saved could be allocated to the U.S. Treasury.

This new alliance would reduce America’s burden for Asian-Pacific security. Far from terminating America’s postwar security system in the region, this revised security relationship would preserve much of it.

While public opinion in Japan might be reluctant to agree to such a reassessment of its relationship with the United States, we believe further discussion would eventually lead to a public endorsement of this plan.

The United States and Japan are now at an important crossroad. This new partnership would enable Japan to develop a new defense-force capability commensurate with its economic power and diplomatic responsibilities. Rather than threatening other countries in the region, this new relationship would represent a momentous step forward for allied cooperation.