Afghanistan: What Now?

As the March 15 target that the Soviet Union set for concluding an agreement to withdraw its occupation forces from Afghanistan passes, that ravaged country seems tantalizingly close to something resembling peace. The Geneva talks conducted by U.N. Deputy Secretary General Diego Cordovez have achieved a timetable for the early withdrawal of 115,000 Soviet troops and every other goal originally envisioned, but there has been no formal agreement because of second thoughts from Pakistan and the United States about the shape of postwar Afghanistan.

The U.S. reservations seem to us justified. The State Department now says that Washington will not end its support for the Afghan resistance, known as the moujahedeen , until Moscow suspends aid to the pro-Soviet government of Najibullah and his army. That change in position--the United States previously said that it would stop supporting the resistance as soon as the Soviet withdrawal began--was brought about by pressure from congressional conservatives concerned that, without U.S. assistance, the moujahedeen would be at a disadvantage against a Soviet-equipped Afghan army. The Soviets, complaining bitterly about the U.S. switch, insist that they have the right to continue government-to-government aid to Najibullah under longstanding treaties. But that’s nonsense. Najibullah’s government, created and propped up by the Soviets, is really nothing more than one of several factions that will compete for dominance once the Soviets are gone, and if the United States is willing to stop aiding one faction, the moujahedeen, the Soviets should follow suit.

More troubling is Pakistan’s insistence that a transitional government must be in place in Kabul before a settlement is signed and the Soviet withdrawal begins. One can’t help sympathizing with Pakistan, for more than eight years the home base of the moujahedeen and the reluctant host to 3 million Afghan refugees. Pakistan worries that without some interim government in Kabul there will be a blood bath--and the refugees will refuse to go home. Yet, for all its statesmanlike efforts, Pakistan has not been able to prod the moujahedeen to discuss the possibility of a coalition government with Najibullah, whom they scorn; Najibullah, just as stubborn, offers a coalition that leaves to the resistance only the most minor Cabinet posts.

The danger in this impasse is that the Soviets may not go through with the withdrawal--the step that all parties except Najibullah want. General Secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev had promised that the withdrawal could begin as early as May 15 if an agreement were reached in Geneva by mid-March, and, while Moscow seems flexible about the missed deadline, we think that the parties should not let the matter drift much longer. Moscow reports suggest that Gorbachev’s decision to withdraw was not fully supported by the rest of the Politburo; some diplomats speculate that delay could undercut his position. Pakistan, the rebels’ spokesman in Geneva, ought to appreciate just how much ground the Soviets have given up--first their insistence that they would not be bound by U.N. mediation, then their demand for a Kabul government acceptable to them, then a year-long withdrawal.

Because Gorbachev has committed his country to a historic watershed--the first withdrawal of Soviet troops from a Communist country--we think that Pakistan ought to quell its reservations and sign. No one knows with any certainty what the future holds for Afghanistan--chaos, a blood bath, another long civil war, a pro-Washington or pro-Moscow regime, even a government of Muslim fundamentalists--but delaying the Soviet withdrawal helps no one. Once the Soviets are gone, the moujahedeen and Najibullah, both armed to the teeth, will have to deal directly with each other. Self-determination is what this war has been all about, so let’s get on with it; in the past day or so the moujahedeen have settled on a new leader who seems far more accommodating than the last, willing even to come to the negotiating table. Even if there is protracted fighting in Afghanistan as the Soviets withdraw, can it be any worse than a war that has already killed one in 15 Afghans and driven a third of the population into exile?