Summit Momentum Lost in Vienna : Impasse Seen as Serious Blow to U.S. Hopes on Arms

VIENNA —  “We may wind up four or five years from now looking back on Reykjavik as a watershed meeting,” Secretary of State George P. Shultz said Thursday, referring to last month’s meeting in Iceland of President Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev.

But clearly that is not the judgment here and now. After Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze tried for two days to reach an understanding of what did and did not happen in Iceland, the impasse between the superpowers continues.

It may even have been worsened by the loss of momentum on arms control that will probably be the result of the failure here.

“If the Soviets want to get Reykjavik back on track,” a senior U.S. official forecast earlier this week, “they will do it in Vienna.” He and other experts had looked for a much more accommodating Soviet position than was apparent here, as well as the creation of a new forum for talks on nuclear testing and perhaps even discussion of a date for another Reagan-Gorbachev meeting.

Blow to Arms Talks

Against this background of high expectations, the failure to make any progress in Vienna must be seen as a serious blow to the Reagan Adminstration’s hopes to achieve meaningful arms reduction agreements in its final two years in office.

The failure appears to be rooted as much in negotiating positions as in matters of principle.

Basically, the Soviets refuse to spell out the details of their proposals to reduce weapons levels until the United States accepts limits on the work it does under its Strategic Defense Initiative--the SDI, or “Star Wars” missile defense program.

Balks at Key Points

Further, according to U.S. officials, Shevardnadze would not confirm here to the U.S. delegation some of the key points Gorbachev conceded in Reykjavik.

The United States has refused to accept even the smallest limits on the Strategic Defense Initiative, although it has conceded in principle that offensive and defensive arms issues are interrelated. One official said privately that the Soviets must first spell out reductions and key sub-ceilings on the different kinds of offensive weapons before any give is possible on SDI.

Shultz would not concede that Reagan had agreed at Reykjavik to eliminate all long-range nuclear weapons, not just ballistic missiles, over a 10-year period, although indications are that the President did informally endorse that idea.

Predictably, each side blamed the other for the standoff. But the U.S. delegation seemed more defensive in the exchange of words after the meetings ended.

U.S. Accused of Backtracking

The Vienna meetings left “a bitter taste,” Shevardnadze complained. He accused the United States of backtracking and “beating a complete retreat” from the positions taken at Iceland.

Shultz expressed regret at the lack of progress and called for a patience in negotiations that, as he put it, have their own “rhythm and pace.”

The Soviets undoubtedly believe that they have a propaganda advantage now, particularly in Western Europe. In this region, Reagan’s commitment to SDI is viewed as the sole obstacle to eliminating all intermediate-range missiles on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

Grasp of Issues Questioned

And the Adminstration’s obvious embarrassment over the President’s confusion in Iceland--over the difference between the elimination of ballistic missiles only and the elimination of all strategic weapons, including bombers--raises doubts among some Europeans about Reagan’s grasp of life-and-death issues involving nuclear arms.

Soviet officials had sounded almost enticing in the days preceding the Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting here. They promised that Shevardnadze would not come “with empty hands,” and they said that if the opportunity for such a post-summit discussion had not occurred coincidentally--when the two men were scheduled to meet here for the opening of the Helsinki review conference--then the occasion “would have had to be invented.”

Asked about Soviet motives behind such statements, an Administration official said he believes that Moscow was “laying the foundation to exploit that vein . . . laying the foundation for a public relations campaign to denigrate the United States and build up its own position.”

Toward that end, the Soviets sought to focus mainly on the points that had been agreed to at Reykjavik--and not all of them at that, according to U.S. officials--while ignoring the points on which the two sides continue to disagree.

Soviets Fixed on SDI

This served to maximize their view that meaningful arms cuts were just around the corner except for Reagan’s intransigence on the Strategic Defense Initiative. “They were fixed on only one subject, SDI,” Shultz said Thursday.

The United States sought to document the agreed points and the remaining issues of conflict after Reykjavik, to emphasize that much more than SDI stood in the way of significant weapons reduction.

How long the present impasse may last, it is difficult to estimate.

An East European diplomat, who linked the uncompromising Soviet position to the Democratic victories in Tuesday’s Senate elections, speculated that Moscow will wait to consider any change of course until after the new Congress shows how it plans to deal with SDI and the Pentagon budget.

U.S. officials here expressed doubt that the congressional elections had any impact on the Soviet position. But one suggested that Moscow will not agree to resume negotiations until after the outcome of West German elections in January.

Another official suggested that “they (the Soviets) will only play this line as long as it may be productive” and will quickly switch thereafter.

Fallout From Reykjavik

“We have political problems with Reykjavik, but so do they,” this official said. “They came in with an all-or-nothing position, and now it’s beginning to look more and more like 1983.”

This was a reference to when the Soviets concentrated on barring U.S. intermediate-range missiles from Europe. Deployment of the missiles led to a Soviet walkout on the arms talks then under way. But they returned, after a public-opinion beating over the ensuing year, to commence the present round of arms talks.

Now, as this official sees it, Moscow may be digging the same kind of all-or-nothing hole for itself by concentrating on stopping the Strategic Defense Initiative. He believes that the Soviets will seek serious negotiations before another 1983 situation develops. But he would not predict when that might occur.