Doubts’ Shadows

The satisfaction expressed by President Reagan and his military leaders about the 6th Fleet’s assertion of navigation rights in the Gulf of Sidra, and the coincident shoot-out with Moammar Kadafi, leaves unanswered a number of troubling questions.

Certainly the Libyan leader has been taught a lesson about the high cost of defying international law and trying to limit shipping in an area almost universally regarded as free to world navigation. He lost some ships, the number unknown at least to the Americans, and almost certainly some men, and one of his missile bases seems to have suffered damage, although the effectiveness of the attack was left in doubt by the necessity of going back for a second day of bombardment.

The United States has also paid. Marshaling the might of three aircraft carriers, a force of about 270 aircraft and 27 warships was not done for nickels and dimes, with Gramm-Rudman only complicating the cost accounting. Beyond the economic price, the exercise cost the United States some criticism from friends who think that this sort of disproportionate show of strength does more to elevate the bandit than the policeman on the beat.

The sharpest allied criticism came from Italy, and that was understandable. The command of the 6th Fleet uses Gaeta as its home port, and other Italian ports serve as major support points for the American naval operations. That association implicates the Italians in what the 6th Fleet does. Indeed, it implicates the entire North Atlantic Treaty Organization as well, for in time of war the 6th Fleet would become the backbone of the NATO fleet in the Mediterranean. To the extent that 6th Fleet activities are not in harmony with the ideas of the allies, those activities strain the alliance. To the extent that the United States ignores the thinking of the allies, it weakens the consultative mechanism that is the glue of the alliance.

If, as some fear, the 6th Fleet became a Goliath, converting Kadafi to David in the Gulf of Sidra, it raised some anxieties about high technology vs. the slingshot. The contradictions in information emanating from the Pentagon suggested some problems with communication if not command. Congress will doubtless pursue clarifications of those technical issues.

Perhaps the most puzzling aspect of all this is the President’s continued pursuit, with all the power at his disposal, of targets otherwise generally perceived of as nuisances rather than global menaces. Vast political energy has been devoted in recent months to organizing global opposition to Kadafi at a moment when this is clearly counter-productive, for it allows him to consolidate support at home just when his authority, under the pressure of a collapsing economy, is particularly vulnerable to the internal opposition.

But there is a consistency to this. The Reagan Administration has followed the same tactic in trying to organize the overthrow of the Marxist regimes that rule Angola in Southern Africa and Nicaragua in Central America. In these ventures he is virtually without allies, although South Africa has given enthusiastic support to the Angola strategy, and he makes more difficult an evolutionary political change in the target nations.

These commitments raise serious doubts about the wisdom of the way in which Washington is using its extraordinary power.